%uFFFD Edit Profile Options, %uFFFD Edit My Info, User, Album Ratings 0, Last Active 12-26-09 8:31 pm, Joined 12-26-09, Forum Posts 0, Review Comments 6, Band Edits 0, Quick Links, Help Forum, Submit a Review, - Add an Album or Band, - Submit News Item, - Create List, - Logout, Musical Neighbors, Rate at least 15 albums to see your musical neighbors, musical taste, You have not rated enough, albums to determine your musical taste, favorite bands, Enter a list of bands, separated by commas, new ratings, reviews, comments, lists, You have not rated any albums yet Counterintelligence From , the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Counter-intelligenc, search This article has multiple issues. Please help improv, and, by extension, the overall defenses of nations, are vulnerable to attack. It is the role of intelligence cyc, and that which it defends. A number of disciplines go into p, so threat assessment, if complete, is a complex task. Many governments organize counterintelli, though one usually predominates. There is usually a domestic, perhaps part of a larger law enforcement organization such a, also known as MI5, which does not have direct police powers but works closely w, do searches with a warrant, etc. The Russian Federation's major domestic security organi, which principally came from the Second Chief Directorate of , security intelligence (the intelligence preparation necessar, law enforcement intelligence, and offensive counterintelligence. Military organizations h, capable of conducting protective operations both at home and, there can be various mixtures of civilian and military in fo, while offensive counterintelligence is a mission of the US C, defensive counterintelligence is a mission of the U.S. Diplo, Department of State, who work on protective security for personnel and informatio, but, since virtually all offensive counterintelligence involves e, the term "offensive counterintelligence" is used here to avo, counterterror and government 2 Counterintelligence missi, testing and managing the double agent 6.2.2 Mana, counterterror and government There is much value in taking , not just a defensive measure.[2] "Charles Burton Marshall wr, the role of intelligence services, or the role of propaganda. "States%u2019 propensities for le, one sort for display, the other to be pursued%u2014were sloughed over." This windo, one that national security decision makers and scholars alik, Van Cleave inferred that "the positive intelligence that cou, how and to what ends governments use the precious resources , but only if our policy leadership is alert enough to appreci, but those originated by foreign intelligence services (FIS), a term of art that includes transnational and non-national a, by Timothy McVeigh, an American, the CI definition reasonably extends to included domesticall, however, that there are many definitions of terrorism, and, therefore, at least as many definitions of counterterrorism. Some count, where others do not restrict their definition, preferring to focus on the action rather than its sponsorshi, laws, and doctrines are relevant to protection against all sorts o, including in foreign deployments. In the United States, there is a very careful line drawn between intelligence and , there is a distinction between the Security Service (MI5) an, often with separate services with no common authority below , for example, builds its domestic counterterror in a law enforcement frame, a senior anti-terror magistrate is in charge of defense agai, prosecutors, and judges. An anti-terror magistrate may call upon France's, which may work with the Direction générale de la sécurité ex, foreign intelligence service. Spain gives its Interior Mini, with military support, the leadership in domestic counterterrorism. For internation, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) has responsibility. C, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, is staffed principally by which is subordinated directly to , 2004 Madrid train bombings, the national investigation found problems between the Interi, and. as a result, the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Center was created., a well-known CIA operations executive said of the autobiogra, [4] that Dulles "disposes of the popular misconception that , that it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thru, he sees that can be most effective, both in information gathering and protecting friendly intell, when it creatively but vigorously attacks the "structure and, including internal insurgents, organized crime, and transnational based groups (often called "terrorists", but that is limiting). Still, the FIS term remains the usual way of referring to the threa, several missions are associated with counterintelligence fro, and, with due regard for risk versus benefit, closing the discovered holes. Offensive Counterespio, at a minimum, neutralizes discovered FIS personnel and arrests them or, in the case of diplomats, expels them by declaring them persona non grata. Beyond that, it exploits FIS personnel to gain intelligence for one's own, or actively manipulates the FIS personnel to damage the host, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap , which, in turn, is part of intelligence cycle management. A variety of secur, including: Physical security Personnel secu, or measures by which one's own society collects information , complement security. For example, when communications intelligence identifies a particular rad, detecting that transmitter inside one's own country suggests, counterintelligence has a significant relationship with the , except those that fall under Chief of Mission authority.[6] , the responsibility for protecting these things is split. His, CIA assigned responsibility for protecting its personnel and, while it assigned the security of operations to multiple gro, such as Soviet Russia Division. At one point, the counterintelligence unit operated quite autonomously, under the direction of James Jesus Angleton. Later, operational divisions had subordinate counterintelligence br, as well as a smaller central counterintelligence staff. Aldr, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of Sovie, and this in fact occurs on a daily basis. The interdependenc, but experience has certainly shown that we must calculate th, counterespionage has one purpose which transcends all others, or security viewpoint. The best security system in the world, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you, but the adversary knows that he defected and within limits c, the cases of the Cambridge Five, and the later suspicions about MI5 chief Sir Roger Hollis ca, the British were penetrated by Philby, but it has never been determined, in any public forum, if there were other serious penetrations. In the US service, there was also significant disruption over the contradictory, and their respective supporters in CIA and the British Secur, and was generally believed by Angleton. George Kisevalter, the CIA operations officer that was the CIA side of the join, did not believe Angleton's theory that Nosenko was a KGB pla, a KGB asset principally in the British Admiralty, but there were arguments Vassall was a KGB sacrifice to prot, including Nosenko and a possibly more valuable source on the, and, in today's world, "foreign" is shorthand for "opposing". Opposition might inde, but it could be a transnational group or an internal insurge, or another friendly nation. The range of actions that might , certainly including military or counterintelligence activiti, but also humanitarian aid and aid to development (i.e., "nation building").[7] Terminology here is still emerging, and "transnational group" could include not only terrorist g, money laundering, extortion targeted against computer or communications system, smuggling, etc. "Insurgent" could be a group opposing a recognized gov, as well as conducting clandestine intelligence and covert op, which could be one's own or a friendly one. Counterintellig, such as double agents, deception, or recruiting foreign intelligence officers. While clandesti, they may also be most vulnerable to the adversary's attacks , remember that such people started out as being trusted by th, and Dulles', views that the best defense against foreign attacks on, or infiltration of, intelligence services is active measures against those hosti, prevent damage and information loss, and, where possible, to turn the attempt back against its originator. Counterespi, and actively tries to subvert hostile intelligence services, by recruiting agents in the foreign service, by discrediting personnel actually loyal to their own servic, and taking away resources that would be useful to the hostil, or in a friendly one with cooperating police, the hostile agents may be arrested, or, if diplomats, declared persona non grata. From the perspective of one's ow, exploiting the situation to the advantage of one's side is u, especially when the foreign threat combines foreign personne, arrest may be a first step, in which the prisoner is given the choice of cooperating, or facing severe consequence up to and including a death sen, but, preferably, actively assisting in deceptive actions against the hostile , sources, methods and resources. Risk management must constantly refle, since effective intelligence operations are often risk-takin, the services need to mitigate risk with appropriate counterm, and, in that environment, have been able to subvert insiders in the intelligence commu, but it is not the only tool. Understanding what leads indivi, systems can be developed to spot anomalous behavior, especially in the use of information systems. "Decision mak, validating the reliability of intelligence from all collecti, each counterintelligence organization will validate the reli, we will examine collection, analysis, dissemination practices, and other intelligence activities and will recommend improve, best practices, and common standards.[8] Intelligence is vulnerable not onl, treason, and leaks expose our vulnerabilities, our governmental and commercial secrets, and our intelligence sources and methods. This insider threa, as with Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Edward Lee Howard, all of whom had access to major clandestine activities. Had , Robert Hanssen's searches for suspicion of activities of his, and is trying to research them. Adding these new tools and , the counterintelligence community will seek to manipulate fo, conduct aggressive investigations, make arrests and, where foreign officials are involved, expel them for engaging in practices inconsistent with their, or turn them into witting double agents.[8] "Witting" is a t, the pseudonym of a former Soviet military intelligence (i.e., GRU) officer, makes the point that a defecting HUMINT officer is a special, having seen a great deal of the ugly face of communism, very frequently feels the utmost repulsion to those who sell, something which fortunately happens quite often, the first thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunt, diplomatic and related facilities are a very real threat, as demonstrated by the 1983 attacks against French and US pe, the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 1998 attacks on Colombian bases and on US embassies (and loc, and many others. The US military force protection measures a, resources, facilities and critical information, and most countries have a similar doctrine for protecting th, not accidents or natural disasters. Counterintelligence For, normally clandestine in nature, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap , as well as satisfying the combatant commander%u2019s intelli, but are not themselves likely to be CFSOs. Gleghorn distingu, and the intelligence needed to provide combatant commands wi, such as military reconnaissance patrols that avoid mixing wi, that indeed may provide HUMINT, but not HUMINT especially relevant to counterintelligence.[1, whether for force protection, protection of intelligence services, or protection of national security interests, are apt to involve HUMINT disciplines, for the purpose of detecting FIS agents, involving screening and debriefing of non-tasked human sourc, also called casual or incidental sources. such as: , who in the process of divulging such information may not kno, but it does not override the role of force protection intell, HUMINT collected by intelligence and CI agencies plays a key, for forces deployed in host countries, occupation duty, and even at home, may not be supported sufficiently by a national-level counte, colocating FPCI personnel, of all services, with military assistance and advisory units, allows agents to build relationships with host nation law en, get to know the local environments, and improve their language skills. FPCI needs a legal domest, the Khobar Towers attack shows the need for long-term FPCI. , and began surveillance of the facility, and continued to plan, in June 1995. In March 1996, Saudi Arabian border guards arrested a Hizballah member atte, leading to the arrest of two more Hizballah members. Hizball, and continued planning for the attack."[13] Defensive counte, although not necessarily that of other countries, CI is now seen as primarily a counter to FIS HUMINT. In the , CI had a broader scope against the various intelligence coll, maintaining, and disseminating multidiscipline threat data and intelligen, locations, and individuals of CI interest. This includes insurgent and , both in scope and classification level. Briefings could then, which usually includes counter-terror. It is not always clea, under this doctrine, who is responsible for all intelligence collection threats a, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint , 1995 doctrine[10] Discipline Offensive CI Defensive CI HUM, offensive counterespionage Deception in operations security, use of secure telephones, SIGSEC, deception IMINT Recommendations for kinetic and electronic , OPSEC countermeasures, deception (decoys, camouflage) If accessible, use SATRAN reports of satellites overhead to hide or stop ac, or the detection of individuals likely to become hostile HUM, as a mole or double agent. There is an additional category r, reveal operations to hostile services, or join terrorist groups. It makes sense, therefore, to monitor trusted personnel for risks in these areas, such as financial stress, extreme political views, potential vulnerabilities for blackmail, and excessive need for approval or intolerance of criticism., problems in an employee can be caught early, assistance can be provided to correct them, and not only is espionage avoided, but a useful employee retained. See Motives for spying for s, the preventive and neutralization tasks overlap, as in the case of Earl Edwin Pitts. Pitts had been an FBI ag, and, after the fall of the USSR, to the Russians. He was caught by an FBI false flag sting, in which FBI agents, posing as Russian FSB agents, came to Pitts with an offer to "reactivate" him. His activit, he told them of suspicious actions by Robert Hanssen, which were not taken seriously at the time. Motivations for , Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community , under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage. It ", persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better un, even unique. Deserving. His situation is not satisfactory., briefings) have no meaning for him, unless they connect with something with which he can persona, until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves i, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime. He sees, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinfo, often simultaneous events. He finds that it is easy to go a, feeling that if the information was really important espiona, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues (even flourishes). In the course of lon, or both. %u2013 Others find that espionage activity becomes, they no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subside, they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to co, one fairly basic function is observing one's own personnel f, or may already have been subverted. News reports indicate th, red flags were flying but not noticed.[16] In several major , such as Aldrich Ames, the Walker ring or Robert Hanssen, the individual showed patterns of spending inconsistent with, such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not be ignored. Personnel in sensi, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach base, a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations manual on the KH-11 reconnaissance s, . Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted his "problem", he might not have stolen the KH-11 manual.[16] By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meeti, there are research data used throughout the security communi, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a develop, and may monitor less secure systems, such as commercial telephones or general Internet connection, to detect inappropriate information being passed through the, and instruction on using them properly so that they do not b, and interfering with the taking of images. In some situation, especially in free societies, it must be accepted that public buildings may always be subj, awareness of the orbits can guide security personnel to stop, or perhaps cover the sensitive parts, when the satellite is overhead. This also applies to imaging, although the more direct expedient of shooting them down, or attacking their launch and support area, is an option in wartime. Counter-OSINT While the concept we, the idea of censorship of material directly relevant to nati, even in wartime, censorship must be watched carefully lest it violate reasona, but the balance is set differently in different countries an, but the UK does have the DA-Notice, formerly D-notice system. Many British journalists find that, although there will always be arguments. In the specific con, note that Peter Wright, a former senior member of the Security Service who left thei, moved to Australia before publishing his book Spycatcher. Wh, it did reveal some specific and sensitive techniques, such as Operation RAFTER, a means of detecting the existence and setting of radio rece, but the discipline contains so varied a range of technologie, however, can draw on the Operation RAFTER technique revealed in Wrigh, it would be possible to design a shielded receiver that woul, so counterespionage can be considered a synonym for offensiv, either by manipulating the adversary (FIS or terrorist) in s, it has succeeded. Offensive counterintelligence seeks to da, or if it can lead terrorists to assume that all of their "sl, there is a greater level of success than can be seen from de, To carry out offensive counterintelligence, however, the service must do more than detect; it must manipulate per, but the distinctions are useful: "Counter-intellige, CF members, and DND and CF property and information, that are posed by hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This correspo, capabilities and intentions of hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This does not, but is the intelligence preparation necessary to conduct off, investigating and countering threats to the security of the , sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, and other criminal activity;identifying, investigating and countering the actual or possible compromi, operations and security briefings and debriefings to counter, or to preserve, the security of DND and CF interests." This mandate is a goo, [19] "The security intelligence process should not be confus, as the collection of this type of information is within thei, himself trained in counterintelligence, is no easy task, unless he is already predisposed toward the opposing side. A, and creative thinking to overcome the defenses of someone wh, although they engage in deception as a function of security , whose members %u201Coften mistrust and fight among each othe, disagree, and vary in conviction.%u201D, are not as internally cohesive as foreign intelligence servi, potentially leaving them more vulnerable to both deception a, especially when not starting as a professional member of a s, can present in many ways. A person may be attracted by caref, or may be opportunistic: a walk-in or write-in. Opportunist, as of a walk-in, has the disadvantage of being unexpected and therefore unpla, assessment, and evaluation, and if the candidate comes as a volunteer, the service may have to act without sufficient time for refl, particularly if the officer approached is in covert status. , and the possibility of provocation is always present. On the, some of our best operations have been made possible by volun, judgments are needed on four essential questions to decide i, if the candidate is the right person for the operation, and if one's own service can support the operation. Deciding, investigation of leads, and file checks. These steps must be taken very quickly beca, and his psychological stamina under the constant (and someti, but the operation must then be planned for short range. Does, his length of service, the seniority of the adversary case officer, the nature and level of requirements, and the kind and extent of training provided. If the opposit, there is little prospect that doubling him will yield signif, especially if the agent lives in hostile territory. But cont, technical skill, and%u2014as a rule, manpower. Negative answers on one or even two of these ques, but underneath the surface his attitude is one of deliberate, emotional state and mental processes. For instance, if an agent walks in, says he is a member of another service, and reveals information so sensitive that the other service , there are two possibilities: either the agent is te, the manner in which the man conducts himself will suggest wh, there is also a need to gain information on the walk-in's se, because motivation is a complex of mental and emotional driv, but casual conversation about Western history and politics m, it is more likely that he is saying what he thinks the CI of, and observe if he reacts with desire, repugnance, or disbelief. To decide between what the officer thinks the, because double agents act out of a wide variety of motivatio, sometimes psychopathic ones like a masochistic desire for pu, religious, political, or vindictive motives. The last are often the best double ag, or a well-trained CI officer, may recognize signs of sociopathic personality disorder in p, here are their key traits: Characteristics of sociopaths The, facilities, and technical support; whether running the operation will pr, at the outset or later, to share the case with foreign liaison; and whether the case, supporting organization, or ally of A Service B: One's own or an allied serv, supporting organization, or ally of B Service C: A third country's service, which, in this context, should be assumed to be neutral. Double agents and defector, which immediately creates the potential for emotional confli, as these operations recruit people who believe they are work, but they have not been told the truth: they are actually wor, depending on the nature of the operation. Mole Moles start , but may or may not be a trained intelligence officer of that, those that are not trained, but volunteer to penetrate a FIS, may either not understand the risk, or are tremendously brave individuals, highly motivated against Country A and willing to risk its r, technology, or military plans. A person such as a clerk or courier, who photographs many documents but is not really in a positi, is more generically an asset. To be clear, all moles are assets, but not all assets are moles. One of the more difficult met, who may enter a service, possibly at a young age, but definitely not reporting or doing anything that would at, until reaching a senior position. Kim Philby is an example o, perhaps from high-level disgust, or low-level risk of having been discovered in financial irr, the defector certainly brings knowledge with him, and may be able to bring documents or other materials of val, a service has to consider its own resources. Managing that a, both at the local/case officer and central levels. Complexit, as did the Double Cross System in World War II. From beginn, a DA operation must be most carefully planned, executed, and above all, reported. The amount of detail and administrative backstoppi, and defectors can tell less and less of what we need to know, because of their cut-off dates, double agents will continue to be part of the scene.[6] Ser, since the case officer needs to sense the emotional content , an allied country, or hostile territory, the case officer needs to know the relevant laws. Even in fr, the case officer needs both liaison with, and knowledge of, the routine law enforcement and security units in the area, so the operation is not blown because an ordinary policeman , each operator had a unique rhythm of keying, called a "fist". MASINT techniques of the time recognized in, so it was impossible to substitute a different operator than, to alert his side that he had been turned. While Morse is ob, voices are very recognizable and resistant to substitution. , known to the agent and his original service, that can hide a warning of capture. Full knowledge of [the , a solid grasp of his behavior pattern (both as an individual, and rapport in the relationship with him. The discovery of , usually under duress Provocation agent Double agent, when actually receiving B disinformation Active penetrator , says he works for A, but wants to switch sides. Gives B access to his communicati, X with A, about which B knows nothing Reports operational tec, which A believes will be more loyal to B The A recruit, a citizen of C, volunteers to B A can then expose B's penetration of C, hurting B-C relations. This may be extremely difficult to a, and even if accomplished the real difficulty is maintaining , which means determining whether the %u201Cdoubled%u201D agen, this process can be quite convoluted and fraught with uncert, a terrorist who betrays his organization can be thought of a, for sake of ease, wherever double-agents are discussed the methodologies gener, who provides information about one or about each to the othe, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff o, whether it was formed voluntarily or not, the length of its duration, and its intensity. The effects of years of clandestine assoc, even if the agent hates the government of A. The service B o, and it is obvious that the case officer's margin of superior, vanishes, or even is reversed. One facet of the efforts to control a , double agent cases are run to protect and enhance the nation, never forgetting that a double agent is, in effect, a condoned channel of communication with the enemy. Doubled , obtained under open or implied duress, is unlikely, however, to be accompanied by a genuine switch of loyalties. The so-c, " who change their attitudes with their visas as they shunt , and usually time-wasting exercises in futility. A notable ex, an organization, an intelligence or security service, or any affiliated group to induce action to its own disadvan, at diverting it to less important objectives, at tying up or wasting its assets and facilities, at sowing dissension within its ranks, at inserting false data into its files to mislead it, at building up in it a tainted file for a specific purpose, at forcing it to surface an activity it wanted to keep hidde, or at bringing public discredit on it, making it look like an organization of idiots. The Soviets a, the Poles in particular, are extremely adept in the art of conspiratorial provocation, the significant information that he is withholding, in compliance with A's orders, is the fact that his offer is being made at A's instigation., a second secret writing system. Such "side-commo" enables A , claiming for example (and truthfully) to represent an A1 ser, Service A surveys the intelligence terrain through the eyes , posing as service B officers, recruit the citizens of country C. At some point, service A then exposes these individuals, and complains to country C that country B is subverting its , where intelligence exploitation of local resources is far le, where persons with valuable access are likely to have been a, or could always have been loyal to his service but is part o, agents that turned again (i.e., tripled) or another time after that are far more difficult, but in some rare cases, worthwhile. Any service B controlling, or believing it controls, a double agent, must constantly evaluate the information that agent is provi, or even other human assets, to help an intended penetration agent establish his bona fid, at some point, service A may start providing useless or misleading informat, another way the British controllers (i.e., service B in this example) kept the Nazis believing in their, was that the British let true information flow, but too late for the Germans to act on it. The double agent , but, by the time the information reaches the Germans, they confirm the report was true because the ship is now doc, the information sent to the Germans was part of the overall , none of which were Normandy. As long as the Germans found th, which they did, they reinforced the other locations. Even when the large lan, deception operations continued, convincing the Germans that Operation Neptune at Normandy wa, so that they held back their strategic reserves. By the time, the strategic reserves had been under heavy air attack, and the lodgment was sufficiently strong that the reduced re, such as learning the priorities of service A through the inf, and this becomes a pattern, service A may have realized their agent has been turned. Si, it is not hard to see how problematic this methodology can b, the turning of one%u2019s own intelligence officers (especia, poses a serious risk to any intelligence service wishing to , particularly among those involving high-level penetrations. , both of whom were senior counterintelligence officers in the, hardly qualifies as conclusive evidence that triple-agent op, these two cases suggest that neutralization operations may b, so B may gain operational data about A and send disinformati, of course, is if they have changed loyalties twice, why not a third or even more times? Consider a variant where, such as potential vulnerabilities of A, which A will then correct Successes such as the British Dou, despite the obviously very risky and extremely complex natur, the potentially quite lucrative intelligence windfall %u2013, how can he offer a better way to redeem himself than recruit, essentially redoubling the direction of the operation? If th, that is apt to be the end of the operation. If the attempt f, of course, the whole operation has to be terminated. A creative agent c, even if he had not been tripled, that he had been loyal all along, and the case officer would, at best, be revealed as a fool. Occasionally a service runs a double, we often continue the operation even though we know that he , such as deceiving the opposition as to the service's own cap, skills, intentions, etc. Perhaps the service might want to continue running the , alter, or halt agent behavior by using or indicating his capacity t, the matter is in shades of gray. The case officer has to con, pressure exerted bluntly or blindly, without insight into the agent's motivation and personality, may cause him to tell the truth to the adversary as a means , if only in his performance of the tasks that it assigns to h, in fact, has to be careful not to disrupt the double's relation with , warning service A of a control. Even if the positive side is, the case officer must restrain his natural impulse to button, he can suggest that the agent complain to the hostile case o, and then only if the agent's sophistication and relationship, or at least work in a place where he can be watched. Control, at least partial, is essential: the agent himself is controlled to a considera, a welltrained agent doubled against his will can appear to b, if the agent is in communication with the opposition service, dead drop, or live drop, some control or surveillance has to be established over thes, he can do valuable work by exploiting the weaknesses of othe, despite their training, have some weaknesses. One's own side may triple an agent, or turn even more times than that. With each turn, the chances of deception increase, so in such operations, the quality of the agent's services needs to be checked cons, he might be offered exfiltration if in a foreign country. He, but might be useful as an occasional reference. A rare agen, who has been with his service any appreciable time, will be able to provide a good deal of information on the pr, and possibly resources, of his FIS. Other than for the most important of agents, a service is not apt to invent new communications techniques, either for hard-copy passed by dead drop or courier, or for electronic transmission. Information on capabilities , from the level of technology and manufacturing quality with , however, make a point of providing their agents with "sterile" equipm, it may become obvious only if multiple agents are compared a, leaving the operational instructions as the only detail that, either to build up the agent in its estimation or for purpos, that concerning the service's own capabilities, intentions, and control of the agent, and national deception, that concerning the intentions of the controlling government, frequently involving the highest levels of the government, and therefore require prior coordination and approval at the, to detect its activities in some field. The inserted materia, which are then observed through another operation or group o, testing and managing the double agent "Testing is a continu, use your own, or assistance from psychological specialists, look for changes in motivation. Where appropriate, use a polygraph or newer techniques for detecting emotional , cross-check the information from the agents, including technical analysis of documents and equipment, surveillance, and further research into verifying the agent's story (i.e., "legend" in tradecraft) While "name traces cannot be run on , do not be stingy with them on persons who have familial, emotional, or business ties with him" in verifying his legend. T, but only as a double." Improve his own security and cover as, however, improve his intelligence collection skills. The hostile serv, or they may become suspicious if his skill and reporting sud, don't volunteer to copy edit! "Require the agent to report , as security permits, turn over to you everything he gets from the other side: mon, gifts, equipment, documents, etc." This is a delicate balance. If he thinks he doesn't ha, he can become confused about who gets what. At the same time, use judgment to keep him motivated. Rather than confiscating, you might deposit them in a third-country bank account of wh, and that he can access on termination. "Prepare all briefin, but it also may make his service suspicious if his manner, to them, changes. "Keep analyzing the agent as well as the case." La, "militant Jihadi", "morally offended by own side" can oversimplify and interfer, his cover, or the cover for the operational techniques. Think about how, looking at what they told him to follow up out of his report, in a hostile service. Transfer him to another case officer o, or arrange his escape to your side. Managing expectations of, their satisfaction with it, and their perception of the agent and his capabilities. Do n, a special risk for the United States. The US tends to rely m, even when they could have used OSINT to collect the same inf, attractive to the other service, but that they might realize he could not have obtained on hi, let him operate in his own way. By letting him do this, you may detect vulnerabilities that have been missed by your, but you can stop the material being sent, or create appropriate disinformation. "Avoid interference.", if the agent is arrested, do not immediately and visibly intervene. In such a situatio, the other side may expose additional resources either to sup, with some truth, that you are not giving obvious help to protect his security, do not take it at face value; always look for the plot withi, but keep perspective. The opposition are not supermen. "If , do not forget that the more powerful organization may not be, quickly, and in detail." The FIS has a headquarters staff looking glo, including dates, of all adversary assignments given the agent. "Keep precise, keep careful notes about who approved the release. "Do not , the more he will be reassured that his own safety is in good, locally or internationally. Ask for advice when you aren't s, weigh, its probable effect upon the liaison relationship." What sho, William R. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be a, abbreviation of the phrase "Smash Spies") References ^, Michelle K. (April 2007). "Counterintelligence and National , National Defense University (NDU). Retrieved 2007-11-05.[dea, Kristen (2006-07-24). "European Approaches to Homeland Secur, Allen W. (1977). The Craft of Intelligence. Greenwood. ISBN , Frank G. (1993-09-22). "On "The Craft of Intelligence"". CIA, Austin B. (1996-07-02). "Coordination and Cooperation in Cou, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)" (PDF). 20, Victor (1984). "Chapter 4, Agent Recruiting". Inside Soviet Military Intelligence. MacM, Todd E. (September 2003). "Exposing the Seams: the Impetus f, Michael T (April 2002). "Identifying Threats: Improving Inte, Jeff (July 5, 1994). "The Mole's Manual". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-1, F.M. (18 September 1995). "Observations on the Double Agent", Anthony Cave (1975.). Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary T, nations and industries · SIGINT operational platforms by nat, Inc., a non-profit organization. Contact us Privacy polic, ,