lfantwister
09-23-2007, 10:39 PM
So I have a paper on Plato's Euthyphro & the possibility of divine command theory. Here's what I have so far...
Divine Command Ethics
In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates and Plato discuss the meaning of piety. When posed with the question of what makes a pious action, Euthyphro argues that a pious action is an action loved by the gods, and that the gods love it because it is pious. In choosing to defend this stance instead of arguing that an action is pious because the gods love it (the divine command theory), Euthyphro instigates the emergence of many more questions that are harder to answer. For example, Socrates immediately asks Euthyphro to identify the essential feature of actions which would make them pious, since the gods would, by his definition, not define piety themselves and instead only reinforce this anonymous feature. Clearly Euthyphro’s argument has by this point become so twisted as to be almost indefensible; however, if he had chosen to argue that the gods define pious actions because they love them (and not that the gods love pious actions because they are pious to begin with), he would have had a more defensible argument.
The divine command theory would have been easier to defend because it argues that actions are pious since the gods love them, and do not have some essential feature which makes them pious. Because this argument transfers the root of identification of a pious action from some intrinsic and undefined quality to the very relevant realm of the gods’ collective judgment, it would have been more difficult for Socrates to argue against (since all definitions of piety necessarily depend on the gods’ judgment).
Socrates could have countered the divine command ethics argument with a few notable points, had Euthyphro argued it. Socrates could have claimed that by relying only on the gods’ decisions about what is and is not pious, there is no intrinsic piety (and by extension perhaps morality), except that potentially arbitrary type dictated by the gods. This in itself would not disprove Euthyphro’s argument, although it would bring into question the innate senses of right and wrong that people generally tend to associate with pious and unpious actions, respectively.
In the actual discussion as recorded by Plato, Euthyphro does claim that the gods have differing opinions on what is pious (although it seems Socrates feels differently). If Euthyphro had mentioned this point while defending the divine command theory, he would have effectively negated his argument just as capably as he did while defending his other definition of pious. Socrates would have leaped onto this point and claimed that the divine command theory would be wrong, since it essentially contradicts the theory’s definition; gods would not disagree on something that they do or do not define as pious. Euthyphro could argue that the gods have to unanimously define an action as pious or unpious for it to be either, as he does in the text, but this would bring up the same problems all over again.
In conclusion, the divine command theory could be more defensible for Euthyphro because it relies more on the gods’ wisdom and does not include some unidentifiable property that would define pious actions. If he brought up the idea that the gods might disagree on piety, it would prove to be a stumbling block; however, it is possible to defend the idea.
Divine Command Ethics
In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates and Plato discuss the meaning of piety. When posed with the question of what makes a pious action, Euthyphro argues that a pious action is an action loved by the gods, and that the gods love it because it is pious. In choosing to defend this stance instead of arguing that an action is pious because the gods love it (the divine command theory), Euthyphro instigates the emergence of many more questions that are harder to answer. For example, Socrates immediately asks Euthyphro to identify the essential feature of actions which would make them pious, since the gods would, by his definition, not define piety themselves and instead only reinforce this anonymous feature. Clearly Euthyphro’s argument has by this point become so twisted as to be almost indefensible; however, if he had chosen to argue that the gods define pious actions because they love them (and not that the gods love pious actions because they are pious to begin with), he would have had a more defensible argument.
The divine command theory would have been easier to defend because it argues that actions are pious since the gods love them, and do not have some essential feature which makes them pious. Because this argument transfers the root of identification of a pious action from some intrinsic and undefined quality to the very relevant realm of the gods’ collective judgment, it would have been more difficult for Socrates to argue against (since all definitions of piety necessarily depend on the gods’ judgment).
Socrates could have countered the divine command ethics argument with a few notable points, had Euthyphro argued it. Socrates could have claimed that by relying only on the gods’ decisions about what is and is not pious, there is no intrinsic piety (and by extension perhaps morality), except that potentially arbitrary type dictated by the gods. This in itself would not disprove Euthyphro’s argument, although it would bring into question the innate senses of right and wrong that people generally tend to associate with pious and unpious actions, respectively.
In the actual discussion as recorded by Plato, Euthyphro does claim that the gods have differing opinions on what is pious (although it seems Socrates feels differently). If Euthyphro had mentioned this point while defending the divine command theory, he would have effectively negated his argument just as capably as he did while defending his other definition of pious. Socrates would have leaped onto this point and claimed that the divine command theory would be wrong, since it essentially contradicts the theory’s definition; gods would not disagree on something that they do or do not define as pious. Euthyphro could argue that the gods have to unanimously define an action as pious or unpious for it to be either, as he does in the text, but this would bring up the same problems all over again.
In conclusion, the divine command theory could be more defensible for Euthyphro because it relies more on the gods’ wisdom and does not include some unidentifiable property that would define pious actions. If he brought up the idea that the gods might disagree on piety, it would prove to be a stumbling block; however, it is possible to defend the idea.